Cryptographic Implications for Artificially Mediated Games by Meyer, Thomas Kellam
Cryptographic Implications for Artificially Mediated Games 
Thomas Meyer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.22.2009 
 
 
 1 
Abstract 
There is currently an intersection in the research of game theory and 
cryptography. Generally speaking, there are two aspects to this partnership. First there is 
the application of game theory to cryptography. Yet, the purpose of this paper is to focus 
on the second aspect, the converse of the first, the application of cryptography to game 
theory. Specifically, there exist a branch of non-cooperative games which have a 
correlated equilibrium as their solution. These equilibria tend to be superior to the more 
conventional Nash equilibria. The primary condition for a correlated equilibrium is the 
presence of a mediator within the game. This is simply a neutral and mutually trusted 
entity. It is the role of the mediator to make recommendations in terms of strategy 
profiles to all players, who then act (supposedly) on this advice. Each party privately 
provides the mediator with the necessary information, and the referee responds privately 
with their optimized strategy set. However, there seem to be a multitude of situations in 
which no mediator could exist. Thus, games modeling these sorts of cases could not use 
these entities as tools for analysis. Yet, if these equilibria are in the best interest of 
players, wouldn’t it be rational to construct a machine, or protocol, to calculate them? Of 
course, this machine would need to satisfy some standard for secure transmission 
between a player and itself. The requirement that no third party (namely other players) 
could detect either the input or strategy profile would need to be satisfied by this scheme. 
Here is the synthesis of cryptography into game theory; analyzing the ability of the 
players to construct a protocol which can be used successfully in the place of a mediator. 
 
I. Introduction 
In the past, game theory and cryptography were developed independently 
of one another, deemed different both in their aims and assumptions. The first discipline 
models the behavior of firms and other entities in situations such as manufacturing, 
decisions of collusion, etc. It assumes that each party acts rationally, or in its own self-
interest. Conversely, cryptography is concerned solely with secure transactions. The 
assumption is that the parties transacting with one another follow, to the point of 
irrationality, certain security protocols or cryptographic systems. The cryptanalyst, or 
hacker, feverishly and arbitrarily attempts to discover the content of these transactions 
using methods such as brute-forcing, birthday attacks, etc. Furthermore, they are believed 
to have access to extremely sophisticated equipment. No thought is given as to whether 
or not the utility of the information is greater than the resources used to illicitly obtain it. 
Hence, the dogmatic determination of the cryptanalyst is unfounded in certain instances.  
Despite these differences, there is currently an intersection in the research 
of game theory and cryptography. Generally speaking, there are two aspects to this 
partnership. First there is the application of game theory to cryptography. Here, we use 
the assumptions of the former to derive new, possibly more realistic, security protocols. 
As the paper by Katz states: 
“Traditionally, cryptographic protocols are designed under the assumption 
that some parties…faithfully follow the protocol, while some parties are 
malicious and behave in an arbitrary fashion. The game theoretic 
perspective, however, is that all parties are simply rational and behave in 
their own best interests. This viewpoint is incomparable to the 
cryptographic one: although no one can be trusted to follow the protocol 
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(unless it is in their own best interests), the [game-theoretic] protocol need 
not prevent ‘irrational’ behavior.” [1] 
That is, these protocols need not take into account what is considered as irrational 
behavior. For instance, if the amount of work required to break the standard is greater 
than the value of any data it protects, the protocol may be considered as totally secure.  
This paper is primarily concerned with examining the second aspect of 
this union; the application of cryptography to game theory. Specifically, there exist a 
branch of non-cooperative games which have a correlated equilibrium (both will be 
described in detail in the next section) as their solution. These equilibria tend to offer 
more advantages compared to the more conventional Nash equilibria. Namely, they offer 
“better payoffs than Nash [equilibria].”[2] Additionally, these solutions “have payoffs 
outside the convex hull of all Nash equilibria, and therefore give more options to 
players.”[1] The primary condition for a correlated equilibrium is the presence of a 
mediator within the game. This is simply a neutral entity, trusted by all parties involved 
in the game. It is the role of the mediator to make recommendations in terms of strategy 
profiles to all players, who then act (supposedly) on this advice. All transactions which 
the players have with this entity are, of necessity, private. Each party privately provides 
the mediator with the necessary information, and the mediator tells them and them alone 
their optimized strategy set. However, there seem to be a multitude of situations in which 
no mediator could exist. Correspondingly, games modeling these sorts of cases could not 
use these entities as tools for analysis. Yet, if these equilibria are in the best interest of 
players, it would be rational to simply construct a machine, or protocol, to calculate them. 
Of course, for this machine to be used, there would need to be some standard for secure 
transmission between player and machine. The requirement that no third party (namely 
other players) could detect either the input or strategy profile of a player would need to be 
satisfied by this scheme. This is the synthesis of cryptography into game theory; 
analyzing the ability of the players to construct a protocol which can be used successfully 
in the place of a mediator. Specifically, the work of Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin, in this 
regard will be examined. [3] 
 
II. Basic Game Theoretic Concepts 
Central to the discussion of this paper is the non-cooperative normal form 
game. Imagine such a game, ,Χ is being played by n players, the ith of which is denoted 
by .iP  Then, it is entirely described as follows: =Χ },)(,){( 11 niinii uS == where 
},....,{
1 kiii
ssS = and →××= ni SSu ...1 . Let iS indicate the strategy set for ,iP and 
the ii Ss l ∈ represent the actual strategies. Hence, an outcome is simply the n-tuple 
).,...,( 1 ba nssv = Additionally, iu is the utility function for iP ; )(vui is the utility derived 
from the outcome v by i. Because this is a non-cooperative game, the following 
restriction is imposed: “it is assumed that each participant acts independently, without 
collaboration or communication with any of the others.” [4]  
However, non-cooperative normal form games in and of themselves are 
not important to this piece. Instead, their significance is derived from their ability to be 
extended to what are called mediated games. A mediated game, ,Ψ is exactly as was 
described above. It relies on the presence of a mediator, M, a neutral and mutually trusted 
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figure. The existence of M causes the given non-cooperative normal form game, ,χ to be 
separated into two stages. Firstly, M examines a known probability distribution D over a 
set of outcomes, which is dependent upon certain inputs from all the players. From this 
distribution, they select some vector of actions, an outcome ).,...,( **1 nssa =  The 
strategy *is is then recommended privately by M to .iP As is stated by Hart and Mas-Colell 
“Each player is given-privately-instructions for his own play only.” [5] The second stage 
now occurs. The game χ proceeds as before, with each player selecting some strategy 
from their strategy set. Of course, the convention is that each party utilizes the 
recommended strategy. A correlated equilibrium for χ occurs when it is rational for each 
entity to play their recommendation. Let )|,( * kssu iii −′ be the expected utility for iP of 
playing ii Ss ∈′ as opposed to the recommendation ,
*
is given that all other parties play their 
recommendations. Then, a correlated equilibrium occurs only when 
)|,()|,( *** kssukssu iiiiii −− ≤′ for all players and elements of their strategy sets. This is 
echoed in the following theorem*.  
Theorem One – Define =Χ }.)(,){( 11 niinii uS == Then, a distribution D leads 
to a correlated equilibrium if and only if for all ),...,( 1 tj nssk = created from 
D by M, all ,iP and all ,ii Ss ∈′ the condition )|,()|,( *** kssukssu iiiiii −− ≤′  
holds. 
 
III. The benefits of a Correlated Equillibrium 
The concept of a correlated equilibrium was constructed by mathematician 
Aumann partially to address his numerous critiques of Nash equilibria. Among these 
critiques is a general unattractiveness of the equilibrium, strange assumptions, nearly 
circular reasoning, etc. He lists them succinctly as follows: 
“Now why should any player assume that the other players will play their 
components of such an n-tuple [(one of) the Nash equilibria of a game], 
and indeed why should they? This is particularly perplexing when, as 
often happens, there are multiple equilibria; but it has considerable force 
even when the equilibrium is unique. Indeed, there are games whose Nash 
equilibria appear quite unattractive even though they are unique…In a 
two-person game, for example, Player 1 would play his component only if 
he believes that 2 will play his; this in turn would be justified only by 2’s 
belief that 1 will indeed play his component…To many this will sound 
like a plain old circular argument: consistent, perhaps, but hardly 
compelling. Nash [equilibria do] make sense if one starts by assuming 
that, for some specified reason, each player knows which strategies the 
other players are using.”[6] 
Regardless of the validity of these critiques, correlated equilibria do in fact offer 
numerous advantages over the more conventional Nash equilibria. Firstly, it has been said 
by many that “correlated equilibrium may be the most relevant non-cooperative solution 
concept.” [5] This characteristic is derived from an alternative, but equivalent 
                                                 
*
 A rigorous proof of this theorem can be found in [1].  
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formulation of the equilibrium. Namely, a game ,Γ an extension of ,Χ is considered in 
which there are n players, each of whom receives a private signal (which does not 
necessarily originate from a mediator) at the game’s beginning. These signals then serve 
as the basis for a player’s actions, and the game continues as normal. The Nash 
equilibrium derived for Γ is simply the correlated equilibrium for .Χ Yet, this calculation 
is much simpler than finding the Nash equilibrium for .Χ This is because “with the 
exception of well-controlled environments, it is hard to exclude a priori that…signals are 
amply available to the players, and thus find their way [easily] into a [Nash] equilibrium 
[for ]Γ .” [5] That is, the Nash equilibrium for Γ almost naturally arises (not so for ),Χ  
from which the correlated equilibrium to Χ may be derived almost effortlessly. Hence, the 
correlated equilibria are quire relevant to non-cooperative games in the sense that they 
are simple to compute.  
Apart from an ease of computation, there are many instances in which 
these equilibria offer greater imputations to all players than the Nash equilibrium might: 
“In some games there may exist a correlated equilibrium that, for every party ,iP gives a 
better payoff to iP than any Nash equilibrium.”[1] Additionally, a larger range of 
equilibrium strategies are afforded to each player under this paradigm. This is indicated 
by the nature of the topological spaces which both sorts of equilibria inhabit. The set of 
correlated equilibria for a game, ,Ω create a convex polytope. The set of Nash 
equilibria, ,Ξ also defines a convex polytope. However, this set is of a much more 
complex and restricted nature, since it consists entirely of n-tuples which are fixed points. 
Additionally, let }:)({ Ξ∈= lliiE pi denote the set of all Nash equilibrium strategies 
for .iP Then, “the sets ],...,,[ 21 nEEE of equilibrium strategies in a solvable game are 
polyhedral convex subsets of the respective mixed strategy spaces.”†[4] In this, another 
restriction is imposed upon the possible equilibrium strategies for a given player under 
the scheme of Nash equilibria. Yet, none of these constraints pertain to the correlated 
equilibrium or its equilibrium strategies. In brief, it offers “more options to the 
players.”[1] 
 
IV. The Artificial Mediator 
Ostensibly, the most necessary requirement for a correlated equilibrium is 
that all parties involved rely upon a mediator. This referee, as was briefly stated above, 
must have no vested interest in the outcomes of the game; the mediator must be a 
mutually trusted, external entity. It is easy to think of many non-cooperative games in 
which the existence of such a body is not possible. Yet, if it is to the benefit of all players, 
since it is necessary for the favorable correlated equilibrium, wouldn’t it be rational to 
simply construct some sort of machine to perform this task? In other words, “can the 
trusted mediator be replaced by a protocol [or machine] that is run by the parties 
themselves?”[1] This machine would provide the presence of a mediator when one 
couldn’t be found. In this, it would provide assurance of a correlated equilibrium, or at 
the very least, that some of the necessary steps towards one were being made.  
                                                 
†
 A proof of this can be found in [4]. 
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Of course, such a protocol would need to satisfy certain requirements. 
Chiefly, when given the appropriate input from ,iP the outcome it computes must yield 
the same expected imputations as the human mediator. Additionally, all transactions 
between iP and the device would need to be both private and secure; no other player could 
discover either the input of ,iP or the machine’s strategy recommendation for this player, 
this is a non-cooperative game after all.  
An Iterative Turing machine, denoted ,Π  is the best candidate for this 
artificial mediator. It can be made to satisfy the first of these requirements (shown in the 
next section), and through further modification, the Turing machine performs its duties 
securely. Additionally, one can be reassured that a correlated equilibrium can be 
calculated in a practical amount of time. This is because it has been calculated that such a 
machine can compute a correlated equilibrium for a game in polynomial time.‡ 
 
V. A Non-Cooperative Game with Artificial Mediator 
To examine the soundness of this artificial mediator, and the ability of the 
players to implement such a protocol, a non-cooperative game with such a referee is 
considered. It should be noted that because this analysis is the realm of cryptography, the 
game consists of certain more cryptographic conventions, which an entirely game 
theoretic model would never employ. Let this game be represented by .Θ Each of the n 
players is first given a security parameter, k. The game itself occurs in two stages, much 
like a game with a human mediator, .Ψ  To begin, there is the “cheap talk” phase. Here, 
the parties run the protocol ,Π  which computes the outcome ).,...,( **1 nrrb =  Next, 
Π privately and securely gives iP  the strategy recommendation .
*
ir  Note that any party 
may choose to abort the game during this stage; they may refuse to provide input to the 
calculating machine.  
The second phase of the game simply consists of each player selecting and 
utilizing an element of their strategy set, not necessarily their recommendation. If it is 
rational for all parties to use these recommended strategies, then a correlated equilibrium 
at b ensues. As is mentioned by Katz, “It is not hard to see that the strategy vector thus 
specified [b]…[yields] expected payoffs identical to those in the original mediated game 
[the correlated equilibrium vector a in ].Ψ ”[1] Yet, a very large assumption is made 
in ,Θ an assumption which is unacceptable in any rigorous cryptographic analysis. 
Namely, it was assumed that the mediator protocol was secure and completely fair. In this 
sense, fair refers to the receipt of a strategy recommendation by all players which 
provided input to the machine. That is, all transactions between a given party and the 
protocol are successful. But, both security and fairness could very easily not be the case 
for the protocol in .Θ For instance, consider a cryptanalyst (possibly a player or a body 
under the employ of a player) who constructs a block in the communication channel 
                                                 
‡
 Interestingly enough, Nash equilibria correspond to the complexity class, NP, on this machine; they are 
believed to require quasi-superpolynomial time.  
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between a given player(s) and the machine. Furthermore, suppose this block functions to 
prevent the player(s) receiving a strategy recommendation.§ Denote such a game by .Θ′  
Despite these adverse conditions, Dodi, Halevi, and Rabin, have 
demonstrated that the outcome of Θ′ is still a correlated equilibrium, at least in the 
following special case. Let Θ′ consist of two players, and assume that 2P receives no 
output from ..Π Then, as they prove,** there is a correlated equilibrium at which 1P  
plays *1r and 2P utilizes the minimax profile, 1m ′′  against .1P The minimax profile against the 
ith player is the action ii Sm −− ∈ such that )},({max ** iiir mrui − is minimized. That is, the 
minimax profile is an element of the strategy set of all other players, where “ iP  [is given] 
its lowest possible utility, assuming iP  plays a best response [calculated by the protocol] 
to the strategy of the other parties.”[1] This solution however does not generalize well 
into games with more than two players. Thus it cannot be used as a basis for the claim 
that a correlated equilibrium exists despite a game not being fair. In point of fact, this 
solution is the closest to proving this generalization, despite the fact that it only functions 
in the aforementioned special case. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
A good deal can be concluded about the feasibility of a mediator protocol 
created by the players, despite the fact that no one is certain as to whether or not 
correlated equilibria exist in an unfair artificially mediated game. Were they to exist, then 
the player created protocol would be quite advantageous and therefore feasible. 
Regardless of its fairness, correlated equilibria would occur, and the players would enjoy 
the corresponding advantages: greater payoffs, etc. Alternatively, if these solutions did 
not exist, apart from the special case mentioned above, there would still be impetus 
enough to create this protocol. However, the players involved in its creation would need 
to be quite cautious when approaching the fairness aspect, so as to achieve correlated 
equilibria. For instance, the players might consider dividing up the task of securing the 
protocol among themselves such that no one player knows enough about the scheme to 
create unfairness. Additionally, the channels connecting the parties to the machine would 
most likely need to involve a cryptographic system(s) widely regarded as impenetrable. 
These measures are equally necessary for the case in which correlated equilibria exist in 
some instances, and not others. That is, they are needed to guarantee equilibrium among 
the players. In brief, because this protocol is very capable of producing advantageous 
results, it is always feasible. Although, it is important to note that more effort may be 
required on the part of the players, depending on the existence of correlated equilibria in 
the general case.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
§
 Even though it is deemed unfair, the protocol is still considered secure. An insecure protocol would imply 
that a third party could capture and decipher the transmissions between a player(s) and the machine. This is 
not necessarily the case when a machine is unfair.    
**
 This is established at length in [1] and [3].  
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